For many gamers, this week's release of The Elder Scrolls IV: Oblivion Remastered has provided a good excuse to revisit a well-remembered RPG classic from years past. For others, it's provided a good excuse to catch up on a well-regarded game that they haven't gotten around to playing in the nearly two decades since its release.
I'm in that second group. While I've played a fair amount of Skyrim (on platforms ranging from the Xbox 360 to VR headsets) and Starfield, I've never taken the time to go back to the earlier Bethesda Game Studios RPGs. As such, my impressions of Oblivion before this Remaster have been guided by old critical reactions and the manymemes calling attention to the game's somewhat janky engine.
Playing through the first few hours of Oblivion Remastered this week, without the benefit of nostalgia, I can definitely see why Oblivion made such an impact on RPG fans in 2006. But I also see all the ways that the game can feel a bit dated after nearly two decades of advancements in genre design.
In response to Donald Trump’s huge tariffs on Chinese exports, China’s government has suspended exports of rare earth minerals and magnets, both critical to many modern industries and the military
Trade talks between the United States and the European Union appear to have gone nowhere, with Maros Sefcovic, the EU’s top trade official, reportedly having “struggled to determine America’s aims.”
In other words, the Chinese, unlike the Trump administration, understand what trade and trade wars are about. And the Trumpers, in addition to not knowing what they’re doing, don’t even know what they want.
Here’s what Trump and his sycophants don’t understand about international trade: It’s not about what you can sell, it’s about what you can buy.
Think for a minute about the finances of individuals. Why do people work? Not to be able to boast that they ran trade surpluses with their employers — “Hey, they paid me a lot, and I hardly bought anything from them.” No, people sell their labor so that they can afford to buy stuff.
The same is true for countries. Importing what you want — being able to get stuff from other countries — is the purpose of international trade. Exporting — sending stuff to other countries — is something we do so we can pay for imports.
OK, in practice there’s a bit more to the story, as I’ll explain below, but the complications don’t change the fundamental proposition that the benefits from international trade basically come from being able to import goods that would be expensive or impossible to produce at home. Think hydroelectric power from Canada.
This fundamental reality explains why serious analyses of Trump’s trade war with China often conclude that China, not America, has the upper hand.
Yesterday the Financial Times had a mostly good writeup of the stakes, which pointed out that US exports to China are “heavily focused on agriculture.” The FT said that these goods are “low value-added,” which I’m not sure is true — U.S. farming is highly productive and highly capital-intensive. But what matters in a trade war is the fact that China can fairly easily find other agricultural suppliers, buying soybeans from Brazil instead of Iowa.
By contrast, the United States will have a hard time replacing many of the goods it imports from China. Furthermore, many of the goods we buy from China are industrial inputs rather than consumer goods.
So Trump has started a trade war that will disrupt our own supply chains. Remember Covid and its immediate aftermath? Remember how shortages spread through the economy and fueled inflation? Those days are about to come back, inflicting especially large damage on the manufacturing sector Trump claims he will revive.
Is the U.S. economy at China’s mercy? No. America remains a highly productive nation that could cope with even severe economic shocks if it had smart, clear-headed leadership. But we don’t.
True, today’s Wall Street Journal has an article with the headline “U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.” So you might think that there’s an actual strategy out there. But I don’t believe it, for four reasons.
First, this story was clearly leaked by Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, or people close to him. In a normal administration this kind of supposedly inside scoop would offer valuable insights into the policy process. But one thing that’s clear about Trump tariffs is that there is no policy process. Individual officials — Bessent, Peter Navarro, Howard Lutnick — keep floating policy ideas in public, hoping that putting them out there will somehow create facts. But a day or two later another official will go on TV, or Trump will post something on Truth Social, completely contradicting what the last official said.
So what we’re hearing about Bessent isn’t really a scoop about Trump policy, it’s almost surely an attempt by Bessent to influence policy. And there’s no reason to believe that he’s actually in charge.
Second, even if U.S. negotiators are trying to cut deals with other countries that would isolate China, they will be unlikely to succeed because Trump has lost all credibility. After all, you can’t make deals with other countries unless foreign governments believe that you will honor the agreements you make. Trump has already destroyed U.S. credibility on that front, ripping up all our existing trade agreements, then making wild changes in his own tariffs every few days.
Third, even if Trump’s promises were credible, why would a European government want to join America’s trade war with China, destroying its own supply chains? If the argument is that it’s worth paying the cost of ruined supply chains because that will protect you from Trump’s tariffs, who trusts Trump not to reimpose punitive tariffs on our supposed allies the next time he thinks they’re looking at him funny?
Fourth, the Trump administration is bringing a knife to a gun fight.
To the extent that there’s a real plan to confront China, it appears to center on reducing China’s ability to sell abroad. It’s true that this will be painful for China’s export sector. As I said, my flat statement that trade is about imports, not exports, needs some qualification because the short-term interests of exporters can’t be ignored. But China can cope with lost exports by aiding affected industries, the same way Trump funneled money to farmers hurt by his first trade war. It can also offset any loss of export jobs by stimulating domestic demand. Moreover, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party don’t face elections.
So while China can manage the loss of exports in various ways, it will be much harder for America to cope with the loss of crucial inputs produced in China.
The overall point is that even relatively sophisticated Trumpers like Bessent are still thinking in terms of Chinese access to the markets of the United States and our imagined trade war allies, when the real issue now is whether China can strangle the U.S. economy by disrupting our supply chains.
PS: I know that I’m mixing metaphors here — China has brought a gun that is strangling us by cutting our supply chains. But you get my point.
Furthermore, America’s ability to fight a trade war is severely damaged by our descent into authoritarian rule. A few months ago other advanced countries might have been inclined to take our side because of shared democratic values. Now we’ve become a country whose government claims the right to kidnap people whenever it likes and ship them to foreign gulags. Who wants to be allied with such a government? Who will trust such a government to keep its word on anything?
Of course, the fact that the collapse of democracy will contribute to our defeat in the trade war isn’t the main reason to be horrified at where we are. Losing real GDP is bad, but it’s much less important than losing our soul. As it happens, however, we seem to be on track to do both.
As the stockmarkets crashed on Friday, April 4, Donald Trump left Washington, D.C. He did not go to New York to consult with Wall Street. He did not go to Dover, Delaware, to receive the bodies of four American servicemen, killed in an accident while serving in Lithuania. Instead, he went to Florida, where he visited his Doral golf resort, which was hosting the Saudi-backed LIV Golf tournament, and stayed at his Mar-a-Lago club, where many tournament fans and sponsors were staying too. His private businesses took precedence over the business of the nation.
Many of his guests were also interested in boosting Trump’s personal interests, as well as gaining the American president’s favor. One of them was Yasir al-Rumayyan, who runs the $925 billion Saudi sovereign-wealth fund and is also the chair of the LIV tournament. Other sponsors of the tournament included Riyadh Air, a Saudi airline; Aramco, the Saudi state oil company; and, startlingly, TikTok, the Chinese-owned social-media platform whose fate Trump will personally be deciding, even as he profits from its sponsorship and support.
Once upon a time (and not even that long ago), blatant conflicts of interest, especially involving foreign entities, were something presidents sought to avoid. No previous inhabitant of the White House would have wanted to be seen doing personal business with companies from countries that seek to influence American foreign policy. Such dealings risk violating the Constitution, which prohibits government officials from accepting “gifts, titles or emoluments from foreign governments.” But during Trump’s first term, the court system largely blew off his commercial entanglements. Now he not only does business with foreign as well as domestic companies that have a direct interest in his policies, he advertises and celebrates them. We know the identities of the golf-tournament sponsors not because investigative journalists burrowed deep into secret contracts, but because they appear on official websites and were displayed on a billboard, observed by The New York Times, at his golf course.
Both the website and the billboard would have been scandals in any previous administration. If they are hardly remarked upon now, that’s because Trump’s behavior is a symptom of something much larger. We are living through a revolutionary change, a broad shift away from the transparency and accountability mandated by most modern democracies, and toward the opaque habits and corrupt practices of the autocratic world. For the past decade, American government and business alike have slowly begun to adopt the kleptocratic model pioneered by countries such as Russia and China, where the rulers’ conflicts of interest are simply part of the fabric of the system.
The change began during Trump’s first term—Vice President Mike Pence once made a 180-mile-plus detour on a trip to Ireland, in order to stay at a Trump hotel—but Trump was constrained by his advisers and perhaps by what was then still his fear of legal consequences. This time around, he knows he got away with a series of crimes, including an attempt to overthrow an election. His advisers are supine; he feels no more constraints. New standards were already set in December, when the Trump Organization announced the construction of a Trump Tower in Saudi Arabia, an investment that posed a clear conflict of interest for the president-elect.
Trump’s family also created a cryptocurrency business, World Liberty Financial, that could, in practice, serve as a vehicle for anyone to pay him indirect bribes. Nobody around him objected. After Trump’s return to office, his administration, unbothered by appearances of impropriety, did indeed quickly suspend a civil investigation into Justin Sun, a Chinese entrepreneur and an adviser to World Liberty Financial, who had also invested at least $75 million in the company. More recently, The Wall Street Journal discovered that executives from Binance, the cryptocurrency exchange, met with Treasury officials to ask for looser oversight, even while they were at the same time negotiating a private business deal with World Liberty Financial. In the past, Binance has been fined $4.3 billion, a record, for letting terrorists, drug traffickers, and people under sanction use its exchange, so the company’s interest in looser oversight is not theoretical.
In keeping with the new atmosphere, the inauguration itself became an ostentatious display of the new administration’s kleptocratic values. American tech CEOs were the most prominent guests and got the most attention, but several foreign business partners of the Trump Organization also attended inauguration-related events, posed for photos with Trump, and referenced their connections to his presidency in promotional materials. Several lesser-known companies involved in regulatory and other negotiations with the U.S. government quietly donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to Trump’s inauguration. Soon afterward, in a late-night purge, Trump fired 17 inspectors general, all people who were responsible for monitoring corruption and ethical violations inside the government.
Trump isn’t just disregarding old norms for his own sake. He’s making it easier for others to cut corners too. From the beginning of his career, Trump participated enthusiastically in the opaque, offshore world of shell companies and anonymous bank accounts, a milieu that has always attracted autocrats, criminals, and anyone else who seeks to hide their money. As of 2018, more than one out of every five condos in Trump-branded buildings had been purchased by shell companies whose true owner was unknown, and anonymous owners continued to buy into his businesses during his first term as president. Now his administration is helping other businesses that operate in the shadows to stay there. Trump’s Treasury Department announced last month that it would no longer enforce the Corporate Transparency Act, hampering recent congressional efforts to end money laundering, tax dodging, and other lawbreaking by anonymous investors. In an executive order, Trump suspended enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits American and foreign companies from paying bribes to do business. The Department of Justice is also disbanding a task force set up to administer sanctions on Russian oligarchs close to Vladimir Putin.
Oversight will be removed from many domestic financial and government institutions too. Trump ordered a full work stoppage at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which had been created to protect consumers from manipulation by banks and other financial institutions He has fired top officials overseeing ethics, whistleblower protections, and labor rights, including the heads of the Office of Government Ethics, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Merit Systems Protection Board. Meanwhile, Justice Department officials are drafting plans to reduce investigations of fraud and public corruption, which means that prosecuting crooked officials will be more difficult. Cuts to the IRS mean that tax fraud will also be harder to identify and prosecute. Just last week, the Justice Department announced that it would curtail investigations of cryptocurrency fraud and disband its National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team.
One particular Trumpbacker has already profited from this new world in which conflicts of interest just don’t matter. Elon Musk, who has no mandate other than the personal blessing of the president, now has enormous influence over the very same government institutions that have long subsidized and regulated his companies. Musk slashed jobs at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the federal agency that oversees auto safety and crash investigations, including those involving his own electric-vehicle company, Tesla. Musk oversaw mass firings at other regulatory agencies that had launched more than 30 investigations into his companies, which include SpaceX and Neuralink.
Kayla Bartkowski / Getty
At the same time, major government agencies, including the General Services Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration, are using or were considering the use of Starlink, a product of SpaceX. The State Department planned to buy armored Teslas. One Commerce Department official, Evan Feinman, resigned last month because of an administration push to use Starlink to provide rural broadband services. “Stranding all or part of rural America with worse internet so that we can make the world’s richest man even richer is yet another in a long line of betrayals by Washington,” he said. Musk isn’t breaking the law, and he doesn’t have to say or do anything to encourage these changes. His new role as America’s premiere oligarch means that all kinds of people and agencies will kowtow to him anyway.
Musk has also had real influence over American foreign policy. If they are upheld by courts, DOGE’s cuts to USAID, to the U.S. Institute of Peace, and to U.S.-backed foreign broadcasters, including Voice of America, will all deliver deep blows to American diplomacy and soft power, in addition to the damage they will do to international health care and humanitarian aid. The end of American-funded broadcasting by itself will particularly benefit China, which competes with the U.S. in the realm of narratives and ideas as well as economics. It’s curious that Musk was in a position to make these decisions, all so favorable to Chinese soft power, even though he has important ongoing business relationships in China. His “gigafactory” in Shanghai, opened with hundreds of millions of dollars in Chinese loans, has become Tesla’s largest production site.
But in Trump’s administration, outside interests are no big deal. To take one of many examples, FBI Director Kash Patel, during his Senate hearings, revealed that he has accepted $1 million to $5 million in stock as payment from the corporate parent of Shein, a Chinese e-commerce company that has been accused of using forced labor in its supply chain; he told senators that he would not divest. Patel has also consulted for the Czechoslovak Group, a foreign arms conglomerate that J. D. Vance, when he was still a senator, said had “ties to the inner circle of Russian President Vladimir Putin.” Although Patel, in his new role, will be responsible for countering Russian and Chinese influence and espionage operations, 51 Senate Republicans nevertheless confirmed him.
But these are only the conflicts of interest we know about. How many people benefited last week from advance knowledge that Trump would reverse his position on tariffs? How many others are making other stock-market bets based on their access to government information? We don’t know the answers, and Trump’s Department of Justice is unlikely to want to find out. We are living in the dark, just as people do in other kleptocracies, and this changes everything.
Earlier this year, I published a book, Autocracy, Inc., which argues that many modern dictatorships are best analyzed not through the prism of ideology but through the political and financial interests of the people who run them. The presence in the American government of so many people, most notably the president, whose financial interests can be directly and immediately affected by their political decisions means that we now need a different way of analyzing American policy too.
To understand Trump’s policies toward Russia and Ukraine, for example, one should ask not merely How will they end the war? and How will they shape America’s relationship to Europe? but Who in Trump’s immediate circle will benefit from the lifting of sanctions? and Have the Russians made explicit financial offers already, and to whom? The rare-minerals deal now being negotiated with Ukraine deserves especially close scrutiny. We need to establish which Americans, exactly, will benefit, and how.
The right question to ask about Trump’s tariff policy is also financial: How will this enormous change to American trade policy benefit Trump? One answer is already clear. The countries and large companies damaged by these tariffs, some of which could face huge losses or even bankruptcy, will have an enormous incentive to play up to the president, to offer him political donations, and maybe even to offer business deals to him, his family, or his friends in order to get some kind of exception made for themselves or their industry.
In a law-abiding administration, personal finances wouldn’t be an important part of the public debate. But this administration’s leaders have decided that laws and norms of behavior that have held for a century or more don’t apply to them. The Republican-led Congress has so far decided not to enforce them either. It’s now up to the media, to outside organizations, and to whistleblowers to keep reporting the slide into kleptocracy to the public and to the courts, to make sure that remaining laws are enforced. It’s up to the Democratic Party to follow the lead of opposition movements in other kleptocracies and to put corruption at the center of their arguments. Before it’s too late, everyone who can do so must communicate what is happening: American government, American foreign policy, and American trade policy are slowly being transformed, not to benefit Americans but to benefit the president, his family, and his friends. Only voters can stop them.
This article was adapted in part from the preface to the paperback edition of Autocracy Inc., which will be published in the United Kingdom in May and in the United States in August.
As we wait to see what fresh hell awaits us this week, one obvious question is, who put these malevolent clowns in power?
The short answer is ignorant people. But political ignorance takes two different forms.
On one side there are “less-engaged” voters who don’t follow politics closely. And to be fair, ordinary Americans have good excuses for not paying close attention to the news: They have jobs to do, children to raise, lives to live. Unfortunately, many of these voters believed Trump’s fabulist promises. They are only now beginning to understand what they voted for.
There’s now a huge debate among Democrats about how to reach less-engaged voters. But that’s a topic for future posts.
But less-engaged voters weren’t the only people who missed the warning signs and supported Donald Trump. Trump also had a number of ultra-wealthy backers, both on Wall Street and in Silicon Valley, who are now shocked, shocked to discover that he is who he always was.
Over the weekend Bill Ackman, a hedge-fund billionaire who has been one of Trump’s most vocal supporters, suddenly turned on his champion, declaring on X that
by placing massive and disproportionate tariffs on our friends and our enemies alike and thereby launching a global economic war against the whole world at once, we are in the process of destroying confidence in our country as a trading partner, as a place to do business, and as a market to invest capital.
But Ackman refused to take any responsibility for enabling the destruction:
I don't think this was foreseeable. I assumed economic rationality would be paramount. My bad.
Indeed. Who could have foreseen that the self-proclaimed Tariff Man, who posts crazy stuff on Truth Social every day, would impose destructive tariffs? Who could have imagined that the many economists, myself included, who warned that a Trump victory would be very bad for the economy would turn out to have been right? Or if we were wrong, it was only because we underestimated the damage.
OK, Ackman is a fool, but he wasn’t alone in getting Trump all wrong. Many wealthy people imagined that Trump II would be like Trump I, mostly a standard right-winger with a bit of a protectionist hobby. They thought he would cut their taxes, eliminate financial and environmental regulations and promote crypto, making them even wealthier. They expected him to back off his tariff obsession if the stock market started to fall. If he ripped up the social safety net, well, they don’t depend on food stamps or Medicaid.
And if Trump II really had been like Trump I, America’s oligarchs would be very happy right now.
It's also true that successful businessmen often believe that their financial success makes them experts on economic policy even though they haven’t made any effort to understand the issues.
Even relatively sensible business leaders like Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase tend to stumble when they try to play economist. Does anyone remember Dimon proclaiming in 2014 that we couldn’t restore full employment because American workers didn’t have the right skills? Five years later the unemployment rate was below 4 percent.
I was struck over the weekend when Elon Musk (I know, I know), seemingly breaking with Trump, called for zero tariffs between the United States and Europe. I think it’s safe to assume that Musk has no idea that trans-Atlantic tariffs were, in fact, close to zero in 2024: The average European Union tariff on U.S. goods was 1.7%, the average U.S. tariff on EU goods was 1.4%.
Finally, great wealth often enables great pettiness. Some readers may remember Wall Street’s “Obama rage”: Financial titans were furious at the president who bailed them out after the global financial crisis because he dared to hint that they had played some role in causing that crisis. Why, he even called them “fat cats!”
The pettiness has been even worse this time around. A few days before the inauguration the Financial Times ran an article titled “Is corporate America going MAGA?” that quoted one “top banker”:
I feel liberated. We can say ‘retard’ and ‘pussy’ without the fear of getting cancelled . . . it’s a new dawn.
I wonder how liberated he’s feeling now.
To be honest, I’m actually glad that Trump II is proving to be such a disaster for the economy. If he had exercised some restraint, if he had simply claimed credit for the very good economy Joe Biden left him, many wealthy people would have cheered him on while he destroyed democracy. Now they may turn on him.
But I hope the rest of us have learned a lesson from the oligarchy’s support for Trump, even if it’s now cracking: Extreme wealth inequality has given great power to people who exert a malign influence on our politics.
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